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ELIZABETH LUESSENHOP & MARTIN MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS:

AN IN-
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SIDER'S

Louis A. Chiafullo*
The inclination to depreciate himself, to let himself be robbed,
lied to, and taken advantage of, could be the modesty of a god
among men.'
Lloyd's of London. The name is filled with magic and mystique; it connotes lavish jewels, valuable paintings, body parts, and
other items for which traditional insurers would not think of providing coverage. What surprises most people, however, is the fact
that Lloyd's is not an insurance company at all and does not, as an
entity, issue policies of insurance. Rather, it is an association of
syndicates comprised of hundreds or thousands of Names, the individuals who provide capital to the market and who are subject to
unlimited liability, down to their "last shirt buttons."
From its beginning in Edward Lloyd's coffeehouse in 1687,2
where wealthy men would gather to supplement their income by
sharing the risks of marine disasters with the owners of ships, there
had always been safety in numbers at Lloyd's. It was least costly to
spread the risk among many individuals. In recent years, however,
Lloyd's has undergone drastic changes, and the losses incurred by
the market continue to mount, driving many Names into bankruptcy and forcing Lloyd's to come up with elaborate schemes to
stay afloat.
* J.D. 1996, Seton Hall University School of Law. The author is a full-time law
clerk in the insurance coverage litigation group at a major New Jersey law firm and
follows developments at Lloyd's of London and the London insurance market.
I FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, BEYOND GOOD & EVIL, Part IV, 79 (Walter Kaufmann
trans., Random House 1966) (1886).
2 The history of Lloyd's of London progressed "from coffeehouse to catastrophe,"
according to Adam Raphael. ADAM RAPHAEL, ULTIMATE RISK: THE INSIDE STORY OF
THE LLOYD'S CATASTROPHE 13 (Four Walls Eight Windows 1995). The book provides
an excellent history of the Lloyd's market.
3 In 1993, Lloyd's announced the news that it had suffered the worst losses in its
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Looking back on her initial introduction to the world of
Lloyd's, Elizabeth Luessenhop recalls that becoming a Name was a
way in which she, a native Virginian, could perpetuate her love affair with England. Little did she know that it would lead her to the
brink of financial disaster. She would have been wise to heed the
advice of a French baron she once met: "Never trust a Frenchman
in love, and never trust an Englishman in business."
Her new book, Risky Business: An Insider'sAccount of the Disaster
at Lloyd's of London,4 cowritten with Martin Mayer, is a point-blank
look at the risk faced by the members of Lloyd's and a rueful retrospective by Ms. Luessenhop. Luessenhop presents a portrait of an
incestuous Lloyd's, an organization that has fed off of itself until
there were only bones remaining. The Names, according to Luessenhop and others like her, were deceived and taken advantage of
in an effort by Lloyd's to maintain its marketplace persona and to
5
further its trading standard of uberrimafides, or utmost good faith.
Although she regrets her decision to become a Name, she recounts that she still enjoys London and even many of the people
she met at Lloyd's. "A few of them, of course, are real snakes, but
even the snakes are at least interesting."6 Her account must be
read with the understanding that her interest in Lloyd's is substantial. Although no one could reasonably expect Luessenhop to remain completely neutral, there is always a bit of acrimony biting at
the subtext of her account. At times, her frustration with the situation at Lloyd's is clear: "All the glorious things at Lloyd's could go
wrong; and in the end, many of them did go wrong." What Luessenhop attempts to do in this book is give us a map "on which to
place the horror stories as we come to them."7
history: over $4 billion in 1993 and an expected $1.5 billion for 1994. See Richard W.
Stephenson, Lloyd's Tries to Insure Its Future, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at DI. More
recently, reports in 1995 stated that the underwriters at Lloyd's had losses during the
prior three years totaling nearly £8 billion. See, e.g., Virginia Blackburn & Patrick
Hennessy, Lloyd's in £8bn Crisis, DAILY ExPREss, Apr. 24, 1995, at 1. Including the
money slated for Equitas, the reinsurance vehicle being set up by Lloyd's, losses over
the past five years may exceed £11 billion. See, e.g., Michael Becket, Lloyd's Losses 'Total
£11.4bn,'THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Nov. 22, 1995, at 25.
4 ELIZABETH LUESSENHOP & MARTIN MAYER, RISKY BUSINESS: AN INSIDER'S AcCOUNT OF THE DISASTER AT LLOYD'S OF LONDON (1995). Martin Mayer, Luessenhop's
coauthor, is a veteran financial writer who has written over 35 books, including
Nightmare on Wall Street, Stealing the Market, and The Greatest-Ever Bank Robbery.
5 That standard was epitomized back after the 1906 San Francisco earthquake
when Cuthbert Heath, a distinguished Lloyd's underwriter, sent a message to his
agent saying: "Pay all our policyholders in full irrespective of the terms of their policies." RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 1.
6 RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 1.
7 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 120.
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At first blush, the book may have little relevance to the legal
field, but quite the opposite is true. Mention to an insurance coverage lawyer that his or her client has millions of dollars in Lloyd's
coverage, and his or her disposition will no doubt darken. Disregarding the fact that Lloyd's remains to most people an enigma
wrapped in a mystery, Lloyd's of London provided a substantial
portion of the insurance written on United States industrial risks in
the beginning and middle of this century. As a result, the underwriters at Lloyd's have sustained substantial losses resulting from
asbestos injuries, environmental contamination, and horrific catastrophes (CATs).8 Though Lloyd's makes the statement that its underwriters have "never failed to pay a valid claim," the huge
amount of litigation against Lloyd's makes it evident that the underwriters find very few claims to be "valid."
It is not inaccurate to say that Lloyd's is involved in a majority
of the major insurance coverage cases in the United States arising
from either mass products liability or environmental contamination. These losses often did not crop up for many years and, as a
result, they caught many syndicates unaware. The Names on those
syndicates were the ones who were called upon to inject large
amounts of cash to pay the resultant claims. Many Names, however, are unable to meet their obligations to pay on the huge losses
experienced by their syndicates. The specter of a collapse at
Lloyd's is raised time and time again by the press; should it eventually occur, the results would be devastating.9
8 Catastrophe (CAT) is a term of art in the insurance industry and is defined as an
"insured event that costs the insurers more than $100 million." Id. at 245. At Lloyd's,
there are shorthand references to the largest CATs: "CAT 87J" refers to the U.K.
windstorms of October 1987; "CAT 89W" refers to the San Francisco earthquake; and
"CAT 88D" refers to the explosion on the Piper Alpha oil platform.
Luessenhop pulls no punches, however, when she says that the biggest problem
was "first of all American, because it was in America that courts had abandoned the
doctrine of privity... and had vastly extended the right of third parties to collect
damages from people who were negligent in their actions and companies that produced dangerous products." Id. at 126.
9 Luessenhop attempts to explain the far-reaching impacts of the financial troubles at Lloyd's:
The governments, the corporations that bought the insurance and the
beneficiaries of claims under those policies care only about the policyholder. The Names are an embarrassment: Their failure to pay will
cause losses to those who have sued the makers of their miseries, to
other insurance companies in jurisdictions like the states in America
where a guarantee pool has been established to make up the defaults of
bankrupt insurers, and, if it gets bad enough, to the governments themselves and their taxpayers.
Id. at 41.
Highlighting this concern are the developments in the recent lawsuit by the Cor-
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In order to grasp the severity of the situation at Lloyd's, and
Luessenhop's account of it, one must be familiar with the way in
which an insurance policy is placed with the underwriters, or syndicates, at Lloyd's. As noted earlier, Names are the "members" of
Lloyd's and provide the capital to fund insurance risks. After a
lengthy interview and voting process, the Name is admitted to
Lloyd's and is allowed a certain premium underwriting limit based
on his or her deposit with Lloyd's. The Names, in effect, ultimately
bear the risk of loss. Their liability is unlimited and it is extremely
difficult for a Name to extricate herself from the market if any of
the syndicates on which she was placed has any "open" years.10
Names are then placed by their member's agents into certain
syndicates, depending upon the risk the Name wishes to take. The
member's agent also help the Names with their accounting and
other matters. Syndicates are comprised of hundreds, sometimes
thousands, of Names and are run by a managing agent.1 The
porations Commissioner of the State of California against Lloyd's alleging, among
other things, commingling of funds held in the Lloyd's American Trust Fund, misrepresentation and fraud in the recruiting of Names in California, and exposing the
Names to risks that were not disclosed, especially in the areas of environmental pollution and asbestos. See State v. Lloyd's of London, No. BC144755 (Cal. Super. Ct. filed
Feb. 21, 1996). Similar actions are pending (though many have been stayed) in nine
other states. The California Corporations Commissioner is seeking an equitable lien
in the amount of $500 million on the American Trust Fund.
California Commissioner of Insurance Chuck Quackenbush, however, recognized the impact that an adverse decision against Lloyd's would have on the California insurance industry (due to the reinsurance and "surplus lines" insurance provided
by Lloyd's to California insurance companies and policyholders). Consequently, the
Commissioner sought to intervene in the action, seeking to have the complaint dismissed and the cease-and-desist orders lifted. See id., Proposed Complaint in Intervention.
Quackenbush has stated that he has "complete confidence in the future of Lloyd's"
and that the reorganization plan is a "sensible approach" to rectifying Lloyd's financial difficulties. QuackenbushBlasts Report on Lloyd's Quake Cover; Commissionerhas "Complete Confidence" in Lloyd's Future, BUSINESS WIRE, April 12, 1996.
10 It was well-publicized that United States Supreme Court Justice Stephen G.
Breyer was a Lloyd's Name, and Luessenhop explains in detail the way in which Justice Breyer was able to remove himself from Lloyd's. In fact, Lloyd's, "in an extraordinary act of ... grace and favor," told the Justice that the Lloyd's Central Fund would
be used to satisfy any unpaid claims on his policies in the event his personal stop-loss
insurer became insolvent. LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 224.
The number of Names in the market has decreased dramatically over the years.
For example, there were over 32,000 Names in 1988, and that number dropped to
under 20,000 in 1993. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 282.
11 There were 170 syndicates at Lloyd's in 1995. LLOYD'S OF LONDON-INFORMATION PACK 1995, LLOYD'S TODAY (Design Heads London Ltd. 1995), at 2 (on file with
author). This number is a drastic decrease from 1980, when there were approximately 437 syndicates writing business. RAPHAEL, supra note 2, at 283.
A syndicate (expressed as a number-for example, syndicate 417) is really a very
simplistic insurance vehicle, yet at the same time the way in which the accounting is

1396

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 26:1392

managing agent, often a company that oversees several syndicates,
appoints the active underwriter for the syndicate.
When, for example, XYZ Corporation wishes to place a portion of its insurance at Lloyd's, it must go through a broker licensed by Lloyd's. After discussion between the broker and XYZ's
risk manager regarding the required terms and conditions of the
policy, and the applicable premium, the broker will prepare the
"slip." The slip is a "piece of paper used by a broker to obtain a
promise from an underwriter to subsequently issue a policy in accordance with the conditions set forth on the slip.""
At this point, the broker will go to the "room" in the Lloyd's
building, a futuristic structure on Lime Street. The room is actually a huge atrium that extends upwards for twelve floors, and it is
dominated in the center by the Lutine Bell, moved from each
building in which Lloyd's has been housed. The bell was salvaged
in 1857 from the HMS Lutine, a ship that had been insured by
Lloyd's. 13 The bell was traditionally rung once to signal good news
or twice for bad news (usually an insured disaster). The room is
handled is anachronistic. Luessenhop explains that a syndicate is Lloyd's equivalent
of an insurance company. "The syndicate acts for its Names as an insurance company
would act for its shareholders, but a Lloyd's syndicate has no juridical existence, being
merely an association of its Names." LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 342.
A syndicate has a life span of only one year. At the end of that year, another
syndicate, often using the same number, will be formed. One problem (which is to be
remedied this year) is that the syndicates were run on a three-year accounting period.
This hearkens back to the "early days," when the risks underwritten most often were
ships carrying goods back and forth from the United Kingdom. The three-year period encompassed the window of time it generally took for a ship to leave the United
Kingdom and return.
After three years, the syndicate underwriter decides what profits (if any) should
be distributed to the Names and what reserves should be held. For instance, in 1995,
the underwriter will evaluate the 1992 year to see whether claims can be adequately
ascertained. If there are liquidated claims, then the underwriter advises the Names of
their share of the loss or distributes any profits.
If an underwriter is unable to ascertain what claims may arise under policies written by the syndicate in the year under consideration, the underwriter may decide not
to close the year and, instead, will leave it "open."
12 Gary L. Lockwood, Lloyd's of London: A Primer, in LLOYD'S AND THE LONDON INSURANCE MARKET 1996, at 49 (Practising Law Institute 1996).
13 The underwriters at Lloyd's have reportedly created specialized "salvage teams"
for marine risks, and some people have alluded to elite squads formed by Lloyd's that
will attempt a rescue of an individual who is covered by kidnapping insurance. Sometimes, the underwriters must secure help from far more sophisticated means. In
1984, the Lloyd's silver medal-which is given for "extraordinary and meritorious effort in the rescuing and preserving of property"-was awarded to the astronauts who,
while on a mission in the space shuttle Discovey, recovered an "errant" satellite owned
by Indonesia and insured by Lloyd's. Lloyd's had paid NASA for the mission. LUEsSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 57.
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the heart of Lloyd's and is akin to the floor of a major stock exchange. The activity is fast-paced, and snap decisions are made
that may have multi-million dollar ramifications, both on the syndicate that writes the policy and on the Names who back it.
The room is filled with "boxes" where the underwriters for the
various syndicates sit. 14 The broker will approach the leading underwriter 5 and negotiate the particular risk and the premium. If
the leading underwriter wants to change any of the terms or conditions, the broker may need to go back to XYZ Corporation for
agreement. If the leading underwriter approves of the risk, he or
she will "scratch" the slip, which entails placing an ink stamp on
the slip and then initialing it. The leading underwriter will then
determine the percentage of the total policy limits he or she will
accept on behalf of the syndicate. The broker will next approach
other syndicates, which will often scratch the slip on the basis of
the leading underwriter's acceptance. The broker continues this
exercise until 100% of the risk has been taken. 16 It is ironic that
the Names-the ones who actually are accepting the risk-are
never informed of the policies they are backing.
Luessenhop takes us on her perilous journey, from her initial,
awed exposure to the world of Lloyd's to her final, frenzied attempt to extricate herself from an investment gone out of control.
14 The "box" is actually an "idiosyncratic piece of furniture, quite literally a box,
closed on all sides with a hinged top on which the underwriter sits and a straight
wooden back against which he can rest his shoulders." Id. at 45.
15 The leading underwriter is an "individual who has a good reputation in the class
of business [e.g., marine, non-marine, aviation, etc.] which the broker seeks to place."
Lockwood, supra note 12, at 57. He explains further:
Any single risk [insurance policy] at Lloyd's is generally shared between
many syndicates, each of which, through the Active Underwriter for that
syndicate, takes a portion of the risk in return for a similar share of the
premium. Because there are often dozens of syndicates subscribed to a
risk, it is not feasible to allow the Active Underwriter for each syndicate
to negotiate separate terms and rates. Rather, the market has developed a Leading Underwriter process whereby certain Active Underwriters, because of experience and reputation in certain classes of business,
are viewed in the market as Leading Underwriters. The Leading Underwriters can not, of course, bind syndicates not represented by him or
her. However, once the Leading Underwriter, who is approached first,
negotiates terms and rates and generally does the underwriting of the
risk, other Active Underwriters, referred to as Following Underwriters,
will agree to follow the terms and rates negotiated by the Leading
Underwriters.
Id. at 45-47.
16 If a broker is unable to place 100% of the risk at Lloyd's, he or she will then go
to the London Market, which consists of U.K insurance companies and international
insurance companies licensed to write business in the U.K.
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It is ironic that for Luessenhop, becoming a Name was "not just a
business proposition: It was a membership in the club, a kind of
recognition that only the English landed gentry can give." 17 It was
a status that few could financially achieve.
Some of that luster has clearly tarnished in the past few years.
Several Names have committed suicide as a result of tremendous
losses, but even this does not terminate their unlimited liability. 18
Others have had to sell or give to Lloyd's their family estates, valuable paintings, and even the family silver.19 Many of them, like
Luessenhop, are justifiably angered at the lack of information they
received regarding their potential liabilities when they first became
Names.2 0
As a result of these tremendous losses-and perhaps to vindicate themselves-many Names have formed action groups and are
suing their member's agents, syndicate managing agents, and even
underwriters. More importantly, the Names are prevailing in many
of the actions: Two of the more recent judgments were rendered
against Stephen Merrett's former underwriting agency2 1 and
17 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 22. To become a Name, one does not
need to "invest" any money; rather, assets are pledged. That was the "beauty of the
system." Id. at 19. In one of her less enthusiastic moments, Luessenhop likens Lloyd's
to a "franchise business, like McDonald's or Holiday Inn," where the insurance brokers and underwriters who identify themselves with Lloyd's pay an annual fee for that
privilege. Id. at 46.
18 Id. at 37. Luessenhop explains: "Dead Names' estates are tied up because the
ultimate losses under the policies they backed are still unknown, and the obligation to
pay the Lloyd's policyholder survives death." Id. Russell Bailey and Fred Yeo, Names
living in Canada, both committed suicide in early 1992. But, as Luessenhop explains,
"as of late 1994 they still had not been released from Lloyd's, and their widows face
this financial nightmare alone." Id. at 39.
19 Id. at 38.
20 Letters to the editor of The Son abound from angry Names who have sustained
inordinate losses. One letter in December 1995 recounted:
When I was encouraged to join Lloyd's one had always assumed that it
was run by gentlemen one could trust. So, when I was introduced to
Mr. Merrett and Mr. Jackson in the Room in 1984, I listened to what
they had to say about their current business, and trusted them. I still
have the handwritten notes I made that day about the meeting I had as I
went round various departments. At no time was there even a whisper
about the horrors of asbestosis and pollution already built up in the
previous years.

I further understood when joining Lloyd's that I would be able to resign
my membership before the paperwork became a burden in old age (I
am 72), and without a millstone round my neck for life. Nobody
warned me of the risks and possible consequences of the disasters which
have occurred.
S. Brody, Letter to the Editor, THE SON, Dec. 1995, at 19.
21 The High Court's judgment was extremely critical of Merrett, and the Names
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against Rose Thompson Young syndicates 255/258.22 The judgment rendered against Merrett was nearly 650 pages long and has
23
prompted an investigation into Merrett and other underwriters.
have been gleefully reporting Mr. Justice Cresswell's comments ever since. The Son, a
vituperative monthly publication printed by the Society of Names on shocking pink
paper, outlined some of the criticisms leveled by the Justice against Merrett in its
December 1995 issue:
"I regret to say that I have serious reservations about many aspects of
Mr. Merrett's evidence and serious reservations about his approach as
underwriter to (syndicates) 418/417."
"The commercial considerations [regarding the decision to close a year
even where Merrett knew that a reinsurance to close figure could not be
accurately determined] were seen to be more important than the principle of equity between Names."
"I find that in the case of the remaining 7 day run-off contracts Merretts
[Merrett Underwriting Agency Management] deliberately concealed
from the [Names] . . .the fact that the run-off contracts exposed the
[Names] to potentially huge liabilities which were not capable of reasonable quantification.
"Instead of telling the Names the true position (and leaving the account
open) Merretts and in particular Mr. Merrett deliberately concealed the
true position and deliberately kept the Names in the dark .
Stephen Merrett Esq., THE SON, Dec. 1995, at 4-5.
22 Nearly 1110 Names sued the Rose Thompson Young syndicates and 42 members' agents for negligence relating to the syndicate's 1988 and 1989 years of account,
particularly with regard to the syndicate's exposure to the LMX spiral. Mr. Justice
Morison clearly stated what an underwriter's duties are:
[T]he underwriter must make ajudgment as to the amount of exposure
he will carry net for the account of his Names. The fact that this is a
matter of judgment, where there is room for more than one view, does
not give the underwriter carte blanche deliberately to expose his Names
to an unreasonable extent, even if the Names on his syndicate join
Lloyd's on the basis that they are accepting limited liability. There is a
substantial difference between agreeing to accept unlimited liability and
agreeing to being deliberately exposed by an underwriter to unreasonable losses.
Berriman v. Rose Thompson Young (Underwriting), 1993 Folio 1410, 1994 Folios
270, 1518, 1637, 2218, 1995 Folios 195, 694 (High Ct. ofJustice, Queen's Bench Div.,
Commercial Court, Mar. 19, 1996), at 44.
23 The case arose from losses on Merrett syndicate 418, where total losses of over
£700 million are expected from 11 run-off reinsurance contracts. Lloyd's determined
that an investigation should be launched due to the fact that the decision raised a
"prima facie case that there may have been misconduct, which could lead to disciplinary action against a number of individuals." Stacy Shapiro, UK. Ruling Spurs Probe of
Merrett, Bus. INS., Nov. 6, 1995, at 1.
On February 21, 1996, Mr. Justice Cresswell awarded a £9.5 million interim payment to the Names who had joined the syndicate in 1985, the year in which the contracts at issue were written. The justice did, however, set out general principles to be
applied for damages to be paid to the remaining Names, depending on what year they
were members of the syndicates. See U.K. Judge Sets Out Principlesas to Damages, Issues
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Ms. Luessenhop comes back time and again to Merrett, who
was the active underwriter for several syndicates and whose Merrett
Underwriting Agency Management was the managing agent for
many syndicates. This focus is no doubt because her losses as a
Name come primarily from her participation on Merrett syndicates. Her tone when referring to Merrett 'alternates between
amusement, frustration, and outright hostility.
Some of that hostility is warranted, as Merrett, one of the most
renowned (and now infamous) underwriters ever to have worked
at Lloyd's,2 4 has fallen from grace in recent years as evidence of his
freewheeling underwriting has come to light.25 His departure from
Interim Award in Merrett Names Action, MEALEy's LrrIGATION REPORT: INSURANCE, March
19, 1996, at 11.
24 Merrett made a name for himself in 1970 when, after Arab hijackers blew up
several aircraft, he maintained that the losses should be covered by the airlines' "all
risks" policies rather than Lloyd's "war risks" policies. The American insurers who
had written the "all risks" policies did not agree:
Merrett argued that the American courts would not regard terrorism as
an act of war, and would hold the American insurance companies liable.
As there seemed little to lose by taking this tack, the kid was given his
head .... [A] federal judge in February 1973 accepted his arguments
and loaded the entire burden onto the American companies.
LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 177.
25 An arbitration panel found that "Merrett's handling of his reinsurance liabilities
was 'foolhardy to say the least of it and bordered on conduct which could be described as grossly negligent.'" Id. at 249.
More problematic for Merrett was his 421 syndicate's involvement with Fireman's
Fund Insurance Company. In 1974, Ralph Rokeby-Johnson, the active underwriter of
Sturge 210, seemingly realized that many of the syndicate's contracts were exposed to
asbestos liabilities. He was so sure of that fact that he offered to pay a $60 million
premium (in a year when his syndicate's premium income was less than $200 million)
for a stop-loss contract. Under the contract, the claims would come to the Sturge
syndicate, which would pay them, and then it would claim under the contract, subject
to a $20 million deductible. Id. at 167-68.
Rokeby-Johnson commissioned C.T. Bowring, a broker and syndicate manager,
to place the contract; Bowring placed it with Kemper Insurance and Fireman's Fund
in the United States. In 1981, after American Express acquired Fireman's Fund, a
review of the insurer's books showed that the Sturge contract was becoming problematic. Fireman's Fund subsequently put pressure on Bowring (through Marsh & McLennan, the American broker that had recently acquired it) to find a way to cap the
losses stemming from the Sturge contract.
Merrett 421 accepted the risk (along with an Outhwaite syndicate) because it was,
according toJohn Emney, the underwriter on Merrett 421, "a highly political issue ...
more an exercise to get Bowrings out of the shit than to place a risk-if you will
pardon my French." Id. at 175. Merrett himself, of course, placed the blame on Emney: "I would state quite categorically that I gave John no understanding, to the best
of my recollection, and certainly no instruction, that he should write that contract."
Id.
Losses from the Fireman's Fund contract were substantial, and Merrett, who only
cowrote the policy, settled with Fireman's for $85 million. An investigation into the
underwriting of Merrett 421 outlines this and other problematic risks that led to ex-
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Lloyd's in 1994 was due to the fact that many members' agents
would not place their Names in Merrett syndicates.2" The exposure of Merrett's syndicates to asbestos and environmental claims is
extensive, and it has been alleged that his underwriting, in part, is
to blame.
Luessenhop talks about several individuals who have impacted
(or been impacted by) the Lloyd's market. She provides a detailed
account of the downfall of Andrew Wade, a Name who lost almost
all his net worth but who, luckily for Luessenhop, "kept a diary of
his Lloyd's contacts and arrangements, and generously made all his
documents available to me."2 7 His meticulous notes and records
make for a crystalline view of what can happen to someone who
blindly dives headfirst into the maelstrom of Lloyd's.
Luessenhop recounts how Peter Nutting, a Name with heavy
losses stemming from his placement on Richard Outhwaite's syndicates,28 was thrust into the position of chairman of the Outhwaite
Action Group. 2 9 The Outhwaite case eventually ended in a settlement.3 0

Luessenhop also speaks warmly about Michael Eunon

McLarnon Deeny, the chairman of the victorious Gooda Walker
Action Group.3 1 It was Deeny who scuttled the first settlement oftraordinary losses. See generallyREPORT

ON THE

1983 UNDERWRITING YEAR OF SYNDICATE

421 (July 1995) (on file with the author) [hereinafter

REPORT ON SYNDICATE

421].

The trade press reported that Merrett was only able to attract about £150 million in capacity for his syndicates for the 1994 underwriting year, down from £350
million for the previous year. Because of the huge infrastructure of the Merrett organization, it could not survive on such limited capacity. See Adrian Ladbury, Merrett
Deals Collapse; Travelers Withdrawal Leaves Lloyd's Agent Searchingfor Capacity, Bus. INS.,
Nov. 22, 1993, at 2.
27 Id. at 81.
28 Luessenhop notes that Richard Outhwaite had specialized in "reinsuring other
syndicates at Lloyd's, and had been, to say the least, unfortunate in his choices." Id. at
93. This practice of Lloyd's syndicates reinsuring one another led to what is known as
the London Market Excess of Loss spiral (or, in shorthand, the LMX spiral). See infra
notes 48-54 and accompanying text.
29 Action groups are formed by Names on a particular managing agent's syndicates to bring a concerted action against the syndicates based on negligence, mismanagement, or other causes of action. These groups have been tremendously successful
in the English courts.
30 The settlement was finally negotiated in 1992 for £116 million to be spread
amongst the 1000 members of the Outhwaite syndicates. The trial had been termed
the most "controversial trial" in the history of Lloyd's, and resulted in attorneys' fees
of more than £5 million before the settlement. The Outhwaite Names had claimed
£150 million compensation for losses stemming from Outhwaite 317 and 661. The
losses resulted from a series of run-off reinsurance contracts, which concentrated in
the syndicates a "considerable portion of the Lloyd's market's exposure to long-tail
U.S. casualty claims arising from asbestos and pollution." See Outhwaite Case Settles Out
of Court, MEAL-'s LrlIGATION REPORT: INSURANCE, Feb. 18, 1992, at 15.
31 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 97. The 146-page judgment in the first
26
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fer by Lloyd's to the Names who were suing; he refused to accept
32
on behalf of the Gooda Walker Names and continued the suit.
Luessenhop notes that as evidence pours out in these and other
33
cases, "Lloyd's stands naked before the world."
For most of the book, Luessenhop sets forth what she, as well
as many insiders and observers alike, believes led to the "serious
cracks in the Lloyd's facade." 4 Luessenhop recounts the first of
the perilous cracks, which appeared in the 1970s. F.H. Sasse, a
maverick underwriter who wrote many outrageous risks, violated
the Lloyd's rules in mid-1970 by giving an American broker who
had not been approved by Lloyd's "binding authority" to write policies for his syndicate. The quantity of risk accepted by Sasse was a
good deal larger than the syndicate's stamp capacity, largely because the American broker had made the policies available "cheap
and in great quantity. " "
After the scheme was uncovered in 1976-and claims for
many of the buildings insured by the policies came flooding in after the buildings were burnt down only days after the policy was
bought-Sasse tried to withdraw the binding authority from the
American broker, but the broker ignored the order. Lloyd's, in an
effort to preserve its good name (and presumably because of
Sasse's conduct in this and other transactions), informed Sasse that
he would be responsible for paying out on the claims, regardless of
how crooked they were. The losses heaped on the syndicate's
Names resulted in the formation of the Association of Lloyd's
Members, which brought suit as a result of Sasse's conduct. 6
prong of the case dealt only with liability. Mr. Justice Phillips found that the three
underwriters for Gooda Walker syndicates 164, 290, 298, and 299 were negligent in
that they failed to exercise the care and skill expected of reasonably competent underwriters. The syndicates specialized in London Market Excess of Loss and were
particularly impacted by the spiral from Hurricane Hugo, Piper Alpha, the 1990 winter storms in the U.K., the Exxon Valdez spill, and the fire at the Phillips refinery in
Texas. The justice explained that the negligence of the underwriters stemmed not
from writing the particular contracts, but from failing to purchase sufficient vertical
reinsurance. See London Court Rules in Favor of Gooda Walker Names, MEALEY's LrIGATION REPORT: INSURANCE, Oct. 18, 1994, at 15-16; Stacy Shapiro, Gooda Walker Ruling
Sets Precedent: Names to Recover Majority of Losses, Bus. INS., Oct. 10, 1994, at 1.
32 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 98.

33 Id. at 253. Lloyd's went so far as to hire a public relations firm and then fire it
when it failed to make Lloyd's "look good enough." Id.
34 Id. at 135.
35 Id. at 136-37.
36 Id. at 138-39. According to Luessenhop, an eventual settlement was reached in
1980, in which the Names agreed to bear approximately one-third of the losses, which
equaled about $120,000 per Name. Lloyd's, however, put up the remaining money,
approximately $25 million. "To those who had participated in the negotiations, it
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Another underwriter, Peter Cameron-Webb, was embroiled in
a controversy in the late 1970s and early 1980s when he arranged
for his syndicates' reinsurance to be placed with entities he personally owned in the Isle of Man, Gibraltar, and Guernsey. These locales were not subject to British tax laws or other unfavorable
regulation. The result: Cameron-Webb removed approximately
$60 million from the pockets of his syndicates' Names (PCW
Names) .a
Additionally, the risks he took-and, according to Luessenhop, he typically took 100% of a risk so that other underwriters
would not see what he was doing-were those that would have long
tails, maximizing his reserves and minimizing any quick payout. In
1984, three years after Cameron-Webb stopped underwriting,
Lloyd's collected $60 million from Cameron-Webb's Gibraltar operation and the syndicates' parent and broker. This money was
offered to the PCW Names as a settlement. The problem with that,
however, was that the money only covered the PCW Names
through any losses recognized in mid-1984. 8
The PCW Names, therefore, continued to get hit with cash
calls to pay the ever-increasing claims. After some posturing by
Lloyd's when the Names began refusing to meet these calls, Lloyd's
started "lending" the PCW Names money from the Lloyd's Central
Fund. Finally, it was determined that the members of Lloyd's as a
whole "would assume three-quarters of the total losses of the PCW
Names as recognized at the end of 1985."" 9
Lloyd's finally set up a syndicate to reinsure the PCW policies,
capitalized with money from various sources in the market. The
syndicate, Lioncover, had losses of $165 million in 1993 but
seemed clear that Lloyd's was relieving the Names from most of their obligation because the committee couldn't afford to have the evidence of the syndicate's behavior
presented in open court." Id. at 139.
37 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 152. Another person who benefitted
from this "arrangement" was John Wallrock, then Chairman of the Board of J.H.
Minet & Company, which owned Cameron-Webb's syndicates. "Wallrock's defense
was that everybody did it, and Lloyd's top management had known about it all along."
Id.
38 Id. at 156. Because the syndicates wrote a good deal of products liability and
employers' liability coverage for American insureds, new claims were constantly arriving and would continue to arrive. After the settlement payment, however, there were
no reserves left, nor was there any reinsurance. Id.
39 Id. at 158. The Names' exposure on the PCW syndicates would, for contributing
the remaining 25%, be finally terminated. Id. "Perhaps this 'cap' on losses, a beneficence never offered to the losers of the 1990s, was facilitated by the fact that the
chairman [of Lloyd's] was a member of no fewer than five of the syndicates in question." Id.
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dropped to $50 million in 1994. It has been predicted that there is
an "'ultimate shortfall' of about $1.125 billion, all of which will
have to come out of the pockets of continuing Lloyd's Names, year
after year."40 Meanwhile, according to Luessenhop, Peter Cameron-Webb "continues to go shopping on New York's Fifth Avenue
in his chauffeur-driven Rolls-Royce and keeps his gorgeous
1
homes."

4

These stories outline the sometimes unlawful lengths to which
underwriters will go to write business and make money, 4 2 and Luessenhop recounts numerous stories of such slipshod underwriting
practices that bordered on the illegal and certainly were unethical.
She also launches a salvo at asbestos manufacturers, as if they were
solely responsible for many of the losses resulting from asbestos
claims in the United States. One must remember, however, that
the Lloyd's market was not populated with doe-eyed, plebeian underwriters. It cuts both ways: Underwriters were making big
money from premiums collected by writing risks for United States
industrial companies, and they did not stop writing those risks even
when they were fully aware of the potential asbestos problems.43
40 Id. at 159. Lloyd's has had to inject money into Lioncover from the Central
Fund each year since 1987. See John Moore, Equitas to Pick Up £750m Fraud Bill, EvENING STANDARD, Mar. 15, 1996, at 33.
41 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 159. Court documents show, however,
that Cameron-Webb is currently suffering from diabetes and collects $895 per month
in Social Security. See Cameron-Webb Told to Pay Up, Bus. INs.,Jan. 8, 1996, at 1. Lloyd's
was recently successful in obtaining a $4.5 million judgment against Cameron-Webb's
wife, which includes proceeds from the sale of one of the couple's homes. Civil proceedings continue against Cameron-Webb in the United States. Lloyd's Wins Cash Batt/e, EVENING STANDARD, Apr. 23, 1996, at 34.
42 Luessenhop points out that certain underwriters would stamp policies after imbibing a great deal during a long lunch:
Lunch was latish, at one or so, and there was no reason why lunches
could not be convivial. The fact that an underwriter might have been
drunk when he stamped the policy slip was not grounds for invalidating
an insurance policy, and there were risks that got taken to the floor only
after lunch and shown only to selected underwriters because nobody
who was entirely sober would stamp them. One senior man was known
to the floor as "the nodding donkey," because he would hold his stamp
under his chin and stamp policies with nods of the head that came naturally anyway after so liquid a lunch.
LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 109. In 1993, a group of Names brought suit
against their syndicate when it was discovered that the underwriter "was drunk when
he signed a slip that lost his Names tens of millions of dollars." The case was quickly
settled in an effort to keep the story out of the press. Id. at 253.
43 The evidence is quite clear that the underwriters were aware of the mounting
asbestos problem, as documents from Lloyd's various American attorneys in the late
1970s reveal. For example, the Report on Syndicate 421 sets forth several letters received by underwriters from American counsel:
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The actions by American Names and state regulators are partially
based on such allegations."
"'Considering the fact that [asbestos] suits are being filed almost on a
daily basis and that this could conceivably continue for a lengthy period
into the future, with an ever-increasing rise in claims handling, we now
recommend that the previously suggested expense reserve be
increased.'"
"'Generally speaking, asbestosis related litigation is increasing dramatically and is receiving national attention in the media.'"
.The above comments and the details of the reports themselves give me
the impression that the US attorneys were continually giving the story of
a deteriorating situation."
REPORT ON SYNDICATE 421, supra note 25, at 23-24 (quotations omitted). The press,
both trade and popular, was also reporting on the surge of asbestos cases in the 1970s.
See, e.g., Decade-OldAsbestos Suits Total $80 Million, Bus. INS., Apr. 19, 1976, at 54; JohnsManville Corp., Four Others Are Sued Over Asbestos Hazards,WALL ST. J., May 7, 1975, at

22; Ellis Simon, Asbestos Claims Deluge Manufacturers and Courts, Bus. INS., June 11,
1979, at 1; Ellis Simon, Insurers Recoil in Wake of Asbestos Claims, Bus. INS., June 25,
1979, at 3; Jane Winebrenner, Asbestos Co. Faces $1 Billion in Suits Without a Cent of
Liability Insurance, Bus. INS., Nov. 15, 1976, at 78.
44 Richard Rosenblatt, who led the rebellion of the American Names Association,
pulls no punches in his newsletters:
We were defrauded the moment we entered Lloyd's.... [T]hey did not
say "Do you understand that you have unlimited liability, and there are
unquantifiable asbestos and pollution losses which we are concealing,
and there are good syndicates on which U.S. Names cannot invest ...
and no disclosure, and no duty of care . . . and the possibility of open
years where you cannot ever get out... the inability to sue Lloyd's in
the United States, and the inapplicability of almost any U.S. laws which
prevent outrageous behavior."
LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 235. Although the actions by the 11 state regulators on behalf of American Names have been stayed pending "settlement" talks, the
possibility of mass Names litigation in the United States is still alive.
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) recently buttressed the position
of American Names when it filed an amicus brief in a Ninth Circuit action involving a
Names suit. The SEC's action was predicated on an earlier ruling by the United States
District Court for the Southern District of California that held that British courts have
jurisdiction over disputes between American Names and Lloyd's. The SEC insisted
that the investors' cases be heard in the U.S. courts rather than the British courts,
where Lloyd's stands immune from private securities lawsuits. See, e.g., SEC Tries to
Bring Lloyd's Fraud Cases to U.S., LA. TIMES, May 8, 1996, at D9. The brief, in part,
argued that U.S. investors "cannot be required to sign away their legal rights when
they invest in an overseas venture." Jerry Knight, SEC Backs U.S. Investors Against
Lloyd's of London, WASH. POST, May 9, 1996, at B10. To permit that would be to "allow
foreign promoters of securities undertaking large-scale selling efforts in the U.S. to
avoid private liability simply by requiring the American investors to agree to resolve
disputes in a foreign jurisdiction." Id.
Recently, the Justice Department announced that the United States Postal Service has launched an investigation of Lloyd's regarding charges of stock and mail
fraud stemming from the manner in which Lloyd's recruited thousands of American
Names. See, e.g., John J. Fialka, Lloyd's of London Faces US. Inquiry Into Its Recruiting
Method, WALL ST.J., May 22, 1996, at 1; Richard Karp, What's in a Name? New Trouble, if
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It has been alleged (in a conspiracy theory worthy of an Oliver
Stone film) that a former vice-chairman of Lloyd's and an "asbestos
working group" knew in 1980 that "billions of dollars in losses lay
ahead, that they kept their information secret from the existing
Names and lured thousands of new Names to their ruin to help pay
the losses."4 5 Moreover, a Citibank employee involved in the maintenance of the Lloyd's American Trust Fund4 6 told people at
Lloyd's in 1979 that "asbestosis was going to bankrupt a large part
of the casualty insurance industry, and that Lloyd's should multiply
" 7
its capital base to manage the losses. 1
Luessenhop also devotes a great deal of the book talking
about the results of the London Market Excess of Loss spiral (LMX
Spiral). 4" This spiral is what finally drove many syndicates-or,
more specifically, the Names on those syndicates-into financial
ruin. The LMX spiral resulted from a loosening of the regulations
regarding the amount of reinsurance a syndicate at Lloyd's could
purchase. More importantly, Lloyd's was beginning to encourage
its syndicates to write reinsurance for one another. Reinsurance
was a lucrative business for many of the underwriters at Lloyd's;4 9
You're Lloyd's of London and the Names Happen to Be American, BARRuON'S, May 27, 1996,
at 12.
45 Id. at 248.
46 The Lloyd's American Trust Fund is one link in the chain of security provided
by Lloyd's, and was set up so that Lloyd's would be allowed to write risks as an accredited insurer or reinsurer in several states. Under New York regulations, for example,
Lloyd's is required to maintain assets in the United States trust funds "equal to its
United States liabilities plus $100,000,000." Report on Examination of Lloyd's, London, as
of December 31, 1993, N.Y. Dep't of Ins., May 11, 1995, at 5 (on file with the author).
The report concluded that the American fund was deficient by over $18 billion. Id. at
24.
47 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 248.
48 Excess of loss is nonproportional reinsurance, whereby:
The insurer decides the amount that he is prepared to bear on each
and every loss, and arranges reinsurance to relieve him of any liability in
excess of that amount, up to a limit. The main attraction of excess of
loss reinsurance is the protection that this can provide against catastrophic losses involving accumulation of net retentions .... Catastrophe excess of loss reinsurance is essential where original coverage is
granted for natural perils such as wind, storm, tempest, hurricane,
earthquake, bush fires etc., in order to prevent too great an exposure to
any one event/disaster.
LLOYD'S OF LONDON, AN INTRODUCrION TO LLOYD'S, § 1, at 18 (Lloyd's Training Centre 1989).
49 Luessenhop explains:
Let us assume that instead of sharing his underwriting risks on the slip
with a number of other syndicates, the managing agent with $50 million
stamp capacity from his Names takes 100 percent of the risk on $40
million of premiums, and then buys "excess of loss" reinsurance that
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this business, however, came back to haunt them.
Reinsurers would often buy retrocessional insurance (simply
put, reinsurance for the reinsurance policy), and those retrocessionaires would in turn protect themselves by purchasing reinsurance, and so on up the ladder. "Because there were a limited
number of syndicates writing such policies, and they all knew one
another, it was by no means unknown for the same syndicate to
take different levels of exposure on the same risk, reinsuring other
syndicates that were reinsuring it."" °
Underwriters at the very top of the reinsurance "tower" were
nearly certain that a CAT would not reach them. Unfortunately for
them, however, the 1987 windstorms and the Piper Alpha disaster
both went through the very top layer of the reinsurance protection
of several LMX syndicates. Luessenhop explains the complexity of
the spiral with regard to the Piper Alpha CAT:
Slowly but surely, the advancing claims on Piper Alpha revealed
the insane complexity of the LMX market. [The Lloyd's Underwriting Claims and Recovery Office] processed no fewer than
43,000 claims on 11,500 excess of loss policies written on Piper
Alpha. The total loss to the insurance industry was about $1.4
billion, but the total of claims-by insureds on their insurers,
insurers on their reinsurers, reinsurers on their retrocessionaires, and so on up the spiral-was more than $15 billion. 5 '
Luessenhop does note, however, that only 1/8 of the Names
in the Lloyd's market during 1988 and 1989-when the LMX spiral
fell apart-were hard hit. When some of the Names complained,
Lloyd's responded: "Bad luck, fellows, pay up."5 2 When pressed,
Lloyd's would argue that the underwriting decisions leading to
these losses were "judgment calls" beyond the authority of the
Lloyd's regulators. Luessenhop, however, disagrees: "Permitting
the underwriters of [excess of loss policies] to hazard the fortunes
of their Names in this way-without giving the Names any inkling of the
perils involved-was too irresponsible to go without punishment."5"
holds him harmless for losses more than three times his premium on
any individual risk. If he has played his cards right-and, after all, he

knows more about these risks than the reinsurer can-he can avoid
losses and reserves for future losses totaling more than the premium he
pays and the income he could earn on that premium if he continued to
carry the risks himself.
supra note 4, at 193.

LUESSENHOP & MAYER,

50

Id. at 196.

51 Id. at 201.
52
53

Id. at 213.
Id.
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Certain underwriters-and, indeed, Lloyd's as a whole-have been
seriously affected by the spiral. The spiral's excesses called into
question the self-regulation of Lloyd's, a hotly-debated issue that
54
continues to be bandied about.
Another problem in the market arose from personal stop-loss
(PSL) policies. A PSL policy allows Names to reinsure their own
exposure on their various syndicates. The underwriters who sold a
good number of these policies were, in effect, "victims of adverse
selection, because the Names most likely to seek out stop-loss insurance were those who knew they were in risk-seeking syndicates."5 5
That is, of course, if the Names were lucky enough to realize their
true exposure.
Because these PSL syndicates were small, the losses were severe. The problem is that the PSL policies remain in effect until
the syndicates on which the Names participated are closed. The
end result, somewhat ironic, is clear to Luessenhop:
In the end the specialist stop-loss syndicates simply will not be
able to pay the claims. Regardless of cash calls, threats, writs,
judgments, the Names on these syndicates simply don't have
that kind of money. The great irony may be that the first policies on which Lloyd's may fail to pay "valid claims" are the stoploss policies written to protect its own Names.5 6
What, then, is the solution to this seemingly inevitable disaster
at Lloyd's? Luessenhop proffers:
If Lloyd's is to survive in any form, its leaders must accept a continuing obligation to abused Names and endangered policyholders, and must join with them and governments on both
sides of the Atlantic to allocate fairly the losses created by the
greed, incompetence and negligence that flourished so long in
57
their historic market.
The market has made several concessions in the past few years
in order to increase capital, placate some Names, and attempt to
save Lloyd's from disaster. In 1993, Lloyd's for the first time allowed limited liability corporate capital so that it could keep the
market active. The infusion of money has been substantial: For
the 1995 underwriting year, corporate capital accounted for £331
million, increasing Lloyd's total capacity for that year to £593 mil54 See generally Ian Kelley, Note, Regulatory Crisis at Lloyd's of London: Reform from
Within, 18 FoRDHm
INT'L L.J. 1924 (1995) (explaining the regulatory reforms that
have taken place over the years and those currently being examined).
55 LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 215.
56 Id. at 217.
57 Id. at 328.
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lion. 5 Additionally, Names now have the opportunity to incorporate so that they can take advantage of the limited liability afforded
to corporate entities.
Lloyd's is optimistic, however, that the key to its Panglossian
plan of reconstruction will be Equitas (formerly known as NewCo).
The formation of Equitas-a limited liability company that will become one of the world's largest reinsurance companies-will allow
Names to cap their previously unlimited liability by reinsuring all
open years previous to 1992. If Lloyd's current plan comes to fruition, then all open London market syndicates will be reinsured
into Equitas. It will, in effect, erect what Lloyd's is calling a
"firebreak."5 9
Equitas presents a rather attractive scenario for those Names
who want to wash their hands of the unlimited liability with which
they are currently faced, but it remains to be seen whether the
Names will want-or be able-to pony up the funds that Lloyd's
will be seeking from them to get Equitas started. 60 The success of
Equitas is based entirely on the Names. Lloyd's and the U.K. Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) have made overtures that if
Equitas fails to go forward, Names' assets will be seized in an attempt to protect policyholders. Some in the market, however, be58 See

William Gleeson, Lloyd's Nets £593n,

INDEPENDENT,

Dec. 17, 1994, at 14. See

also

LLOYD'S OF LONDON, PLANNING FOR PROFIT: A BUSINESS PLAN FOR LLOYD'S OF
LONDON 2 (1993).
59 Lloyd's Reconstruction and Renewal, ONE LIME STREET, May 1995, at 42.
60 Originally, Lloyd's stated that Equitas would reinsure all outstanding liabilities

for 1985 and prior years. This was because Lloyd's and the London Market (and most
other insurers) began using "claims-made" policies in 1986. Prior to 1986, insurance
was primarily written on an "occurrence" basis, where the policy would provide coverage for an occurrence that took place during the policy period. "Occurrence" is generally defined in insurance policies as "an accident or happening or event or a
continuous or repeated exposure to conditions which unexpectedly and unintentionally result" in injury during the policy period. This language was what allowed claims
to arise under the policies after 20, 30, or 40 years had elapsed after their expiration,
often called "long-tail" claims.
"Long-tail" is often used to describe occurrences where the injury is not discoverable until many years after the "delictual act." Therefore, long-term exposure to an
allegedly harmful product or hazardous environmental conditions may result in
claims being brought years after the insured event, The "tail" is the lapse of time
between the date of the occurrence and the time of the claim. See, e.g., Zuckerman v.
National Union Fire Ins. Co., 100 N.J. 304, 311-12, 495 A.2d 395, 399 (1985).
The claims-made policy was designed to ameliorate these long-tail claims. "Unlike an occurrence-based CGL policy which covers injury that takes place during the
policy period regardless of whether the loss is reported during that period, a claimsmade policy covers liability for bodily injury or property damage only if a claim is
asserted during the policy period." BARRY R. OSTRAGER & THOMAS R. NEWMAN, HANDBOOK ON INSURANCE COVERAGE DISPUTES, § 4.02[b] [4], at 96 (8th ed. 1995).
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lieve that to be a bluff.6'

As a limited liability reinsurer, Equitas must be funded both as
to the cost of future claims and with a surplus sufficient to satisfy
regulators around the world. If Equitas eventually is unable to
meet its liabilities, Lloyd's would have to recapitalize the company
(by additional levies on the Names or other means) or Equitas
would become insolvent. In the event of Equitas's insolvency, the
losses would then revert back to the Names, the evil that Lloyd's is
attempting to prevent.
Recently, the Names were provided with a "preliminary" report outlining what each will have to pay in order to reinsure their
past liabilities into Equitas. There has been some resistance to
Equitas because Names realize that if the reinsurance vehicle fails,
the liability will revert back to them. In order to sweeten the bitter
pill, Lloyd's has made a "market settlement" offer (revised and increased thrice). As of May 1996, the proposed amount to be divided up among the Names who have, are, or plan on litigating
against Lloyd's was a little over £3.1 billion.6 2 Of course, the
Names who have won judgments that have not yet been paid, and
those currently litigating, will be paid first. This begs the question
of how much will be left for Names who have not yet sued. And,
from Lloyd's point of view, it is a brilliant maneuver: The settlement monies will merely be credited to the Names' accounts and
used to meet Names' cash calls.6 3 Some Names, of course, are not
pleased with that prong of the settlement, nor with the plan by
Lloyd's to seize any money awarded to the Names as a result of any
judgments.64
61 Randolph Fields, Editorial, Equitas Lurches Forward,LONDON MARKET REPORTING
SERVICE, Jan. 1996, at 1. Fields reasons, and rightly so, that if Lloyd's and the DTI "are
prepared to abandon the policyholders if Equitas fails, then why not now?" Id.
62 Michael Becket, Rowland Slashes EquitasFunding to £lbn, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH,
May 11, 1996, at 1.
63 Luessenhop analogizes the settlement to:
a bunch of gamblers who have been playing a roulette wheel in Las
Vegas, and having compared notes go to a lawyer and ask him to sue on
the grounds that the casino has been running a crooked wheel. The
casino, pained, says it has not been running a crooked wheel, it runs an
honest wheel, these fellows are just sore losers, if the matter ever came
to trial the casino would win hands down, but to avoid bad publicity its
prepared to offer a settlement: it will give the plaintiffs markers so they
can return to the casino and continue to play the wheel.
LUESSENHOP & MAYER, supra note 4, at 282.
64 In April 1996, Lloyd's and leaders of the largest action groups had moved for an
adjournment of the case pending in the High Court that would determine whether
Lloyd's could require any damages won by Names in any of the litigations pending
against Lloyd's to be utilized to settle the Names' market debts. Lloyd's fears that
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News of the developments regarding Equitas and the market
settlement changes daily. Names were somewhat heartened by recent news that the original estimates of the cost of Equitas were
somewhat higher than necessary. It appears now that the Names
will be required to come up with only £1.5 billion rather than the
£1.9 billion previously announced.6 5 The DTI granted a conditional authorization for Equitas in late March 1996, but that approval is subject to certain conditions. Namely, Lloyd's must first
demonstrate that the assets available to Equitas are sufficient to
meet the minimum solvency margin the DTI has required. Additionally, if Lloyd's finds that there is an increase in the estimate of
potential liabilities before August 1996, there must be a matching
increase in assets. The figures provided by Lloyd's to the DTI estimate that the assets for Equitas will be at least £13.5 billion, with a
margin of at least £500 million of assets over liabilities. 66
Although it is difficult to feel sorry for those Names who made
a great deal of money before the LMX spiral and CATs caught up
many Names might resist paying their debts if the money is passed directly to the
Names. Leaders of the Action Groups believed that such an adjournment would help
settlement talks progress. See Ralph Atkins, Names Attempt to Delay Legal Action, FIN.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at 8. Despite the backing, the High Court rejected the plans for
an adjournment. Sir Richard Scott, the vice-chancellor, reasoned that the adjournment request was "ulterior to the proceedings." Michael Becket, Lloyd's Fails in Bid to
Delay Lawsuit, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr. 18, 1996, at 23. See also Ralph Atkins, Lloyd's
Faces a Fresh Headache, FIN. TrmEs, Apr. 18, 1996, at 10.
In May, the High Court ruled that Lloyd's did not have the right to seize cash
compensation awarded to litigating Names. See, e.g., Lisa Buckingham, Court Defeat
Spells LargerSettlement Bill for Lloyd's in Battle With Names, THE GUARDIAN, May 18, 1996,
at 38; Clare Sambrook, Knock-back for Lloyd's as Judge Backs Names, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 18, 1996, at 3. Lloyd's has stated emphatically that it will appeal the
decision.
65 See Clare Sambrook, Double Boost Raises Lloyd's Hopes, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, Apr.
13, 1996, at 1. Lloyd's expects that it will be providing individual syndicates with final
figures for their reinsurance into Equitas, and Names can expect to have their personal statements sometime in May. Id. There have been reports that Lloyd's will not
reinsure Lioncover (the syndicate set up to fund the losses from the PCW syndicates)
into Equitas. Regardless, the tab for Lioncover will still have to be picked up by the
Names who continue to invest in the market. See Anthony Hilton, EasierBurden, EvENING STANDARD, Apr. 9, 1996, at 31.
Equitas has become a rather expensive enterprise for Lloyd's, which revealed that
the cost of formulating the numbers required for Equitas is over £100 million. The
money, which Lloyd's no doubt sees as well-spent, has been paid to various firms
throughout the City of London, including the firms of Freshfields and NM Rothschild; accountants Coopers & Lybrand, Price Waterhouse, and Touche Ross; auditors
Neville Russell and Ernst & Young; Tillinghast, an actuarial firm; and the investment
bank Solomon Brothers. See, e.g., Clare Sambrook, Equitas Insurance Project to Cost
1i1Om Says Lloyd's, THE DAILY TELEGRAPH, May 8, 1996, at 23.
66 See, e.g., Equitas Granted ConditionalApproval by UK Regulators, MEALEY's LrmGATION REPORT: REINSURANcE, Apr. 10, 1996, at 7.
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with them, many Names were unaware of the mounting problems
and, consequently, are now unable to meet their liabilities. It is
quite easy to feel sorry for Names like Bridget Milling Smith. Ms.
Milling Smith was only twenty-six when her husband, a Royal
Marine officer, was killed while on active duty. She was left with
two children and no job, yet a financial advisor convinced her to
become a Name. She had a small cottage and the dividends from
£70,000 in shares as her only income. Her members' agent told
her not to worry her "pretty little head." She listened because, as
she puts it, she was "naive" as to financial matters.
A decade later, Mrs. Milling Smith finds herself in the nightmarish situation of facing never-ending calls from several open year
syndicates with huge asbestos and pollution liabilities. She has
given up counting how much she owes, but it must be more
than £200,000. "It doesn't make any difference anymore," she
says bleakly. She has had to appeal to the Lloyd's hardship committee which
has allowed her to stay in her house for the time
67
being.

Would external regulation of Lloyd's have changed things?
Was it strictly the lax attitude or poor risk selection of maverick
underwriters that caused the losses? The blame is not easy to
place. The results, however, are clear. Ron Sandler, the chief executive of Lloyd's, ominously announced recently that if the reorganization plan proposed by Lloyd's is hindered, "large numbers of
American insurance companies would collapse" and Lloyd's would
be forced into receivership.6 8
The amount of litigation-by American Names, U.S. regulators, action groups, policyholders, and others-is tremendous.
The market settlement, if accepted by the Names, will ease only
some of that.69 Equitas is being hailed as the paradigm of a new
Lloyd's, but is it just a vehicle to prolong a default on policies?
Clearly, Equitas would have been unnecessary had it not been for
disastrous losses resulting from the syndicates' risk selection. The
Names are caught between the Scylla of agreeing to fund Equitas
(and possibly having the losses revert back to them if Equitas fails)

supra note 2, at 11.
e.g., Michael Becket, Lloyd's Gives Warningto U.S., THE DAILy TELEGRAPH, May
29, 1996, at 24.
69 There is still a great deal of resistance by the Lloyd's Names Association Working Party to the settlement offer. See Becket, supra note 62. It seems, however, that
Lloyd's is nearing the end of its ability to raise any more money for the proposal, so
the Names will need to make a decision soon.
67 RAPHAEL,

68 See,
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and the Charybdis of refusing to pay into Equitas and having the
Lloyd's market go into run-off or, worse, insolvency.
Many people in the market want the new Lloyd's reconstruction plan to work, including the Names. The strides that have been
taken by Lloyd's in the past year have been important, but Luessenhop notes that "the losses are too great to be finessed by the
gimmickry of the new business plans or the reconstructions and
renewals."70 It is a bleak picture that Luessenhop paints, partly because the trail of ruination and tragedy is long. As Adam Raphael
succinctly states, the price in human misery will be a heavy one,
"paid by those who had least and knew least."7 1 Lives have been
shattered, marriages torn apart, and careers ruined. Names have
been lied to and taken advantage of, and many of them share Ms.
Milling Smith's sentiment: "If I'd known then what I know now, I
wouldn't have dreamt of going anywhere near Lloyd's."7 2

70 LUESSENHOP & MAYER,
71 Id. at 13.
72 Id. at 11.

supra note 4, at 328.

